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
A HANDBOOK
FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF COMMUNIST
GUERRILLA/TERRORIST
OPERATIONS

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FOREWORD

1 March 1962

This working paper was prepared within the Special Warfare Division, Office of the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, ODCSOPS, Department of the Army.

The views expressed in this working paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Army. It was prepared to serve as background material for consideration in the development of special warfare plans and policies on this subject.

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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In the decade and a half since World War II International Communism has won a succession of victories in its struggle for world revolution and domination unequalled in the preceding forty years of its existence. Since the termination of World War II, nearly 700 million people and 5 million square miles, about one-tenth of the total land area of the world and about one quarter of its population, have been brought under the control of communist regimes.

While occupying the attention of the free world through pressure and the threat of overt military action along the periphery of the Iron and Bamboo curtains and the war in Korea, the communists have concentrated their efforts on the seizure of power in targeted nations through internal means. These target countries now constitute a major portion of Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, vital to the defense of the Free World.

Utilizing their established world-wide subversive apparatus, employing indigenous communist party cadres, they have exploited a wide variety of techniques ranging the gamut from civil war, revolution, terrorism and guerrilla warfare through psychological and political action to achieve these gains.

Allying themselves with budding national independence movements in colonial areas and popular front type governments in former dictatorships, the communists have scored notable successes and considerable public support through promises of a material betterment and achievement of nationalist aspirations in a wide variety of situations and areas.

The primary and ultimate objectives of the communists has been and will remain the total subversion and seizure of government in all the target areas.

Temporary pauses in this conflict in certain areas have been countenanced by the communists upon achieving interim objectives such as, representation in national front governments, acceptance of communists in the civil, military and police establishments and political recognition of the indigenous communist party.

These phase line pauses afford the communists the opportunity for regroupment and preparatory action in the organizational, psychological and subversive fields prior to the resumption of the offensive in the all-out bid for power.

Diplomatic and financial reorientation of the target areas toward Moscow and/or Peiping is a recognized intermediate objective with the achievement of an anti-west or neutral status of the target as a minimum goal.

The communist strategy and tactics in the form of the so-called "People's War" waged by "Revolutionary Warfare" has evolved through

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trial and error in five years of civil war in Russia (1918-23), twenty-five years of conflict in China (1924-49) and continuing conflict in Indo-China and Malaya since 1945.

The pattern and complete nature of the conflict has no precedent in Western European or American history.

The inadequacy of utilizing conventional military tactics, techniques and formations in combating "Revolutionary Warfare" has been amply demonstrated by the Germans, Italians, and Japanese in World War II. Since World War II these mistakes have been repeated by the Greeks, Dutch, French and British as well as by the governments of several smaller countries.

The assumption that the solution of the problem is solely a military one has been proven erroneous.

The basic elements of success of the "People's War" have rested in the active support of a minority of the target population and the tacit support or neutrality of the balance of the people, due largely to apathy, disgust or open hostility toward the regime in power.

The exploitable causes for dissatisfaction have been the elementary desires of the target population for national independence, relief from racial oppression, elimination of colonial or foreign exploitation, alleviation of economic destitution, elimination of corruption and the stabilization of the political and social structure.

Revolutionary Warfare has been defeated or suppressed only in those areas where substantive efforts have been made by the government in power toward the correction of the deficiencies exploited by the Reds, and imaginative positive action taken to insure the support of the population for the government program. Under these basic conditions, the successful prosecution of suppression operations can be initiated, utilizing specially tailored organizations, tactics, techniques and personnel suitably trained for this specific mission.

The failure of the majority of suppressing powers to realize the nature and magnitude of the conflict and the necessity for adoption of special military measures suitable to combat Revolutionary Warfare has resulted in a chain of major military defeats or prolonged wars of attrition precipitating civil collapse and de-facto seizure of power by the insurgents.

The successful employment of large conventional forces in these operations has been characterized by alternating pursuits of guerrilla/terrorist forces in grand sweeps and drives and subsequent withdrawal at the conclusion of the unsuccessful chase to a defensive posture behind the barbed wire and bunkers to suffer a war of attrition and the relinquishment of control of the countryside to the enemy.

The use of major elements of foreign (to the area) troops to suppress such guerrilla/terrorist operations is neither practicable from a military viewpoint nor psychologically feasible.

These forces are generally unfamiliar with the customs, geography, language, and people of the area and have not been trained in the specific techniques and tactics necessary for successful operations.

The presence of major bodies of foreign troops is unpalatable to the indigenous population and discredits the government in power as a "puppet" or "tool" of the foreign imperialists incapable of ruling without the support of foreign troops.

However, the judicious and timely use of small foreign specialist teams of military and civil personnel for the purpose of providing assistance and advice in this field has proven to be both feasible and successful.

No panacea exists that will provide a quick and easily palatable formula for the suppression of guerrilla/terrorists.

Suppression operations are intrinsically complex in nature and generally must be conducted over protracted periods of time requiring maximum utilization of all resources available in a unified plan.

The following text outlines the problem, describes the enemy and his operations and indicates the framework of command organization, tactics and techniques employed in suppression operations.

The material presented is neither original nor unique but encompasses those practical measures successfully utilized in past and contemporary operations against guerrilla/terrorist activity.

The organization and content of the material presented is condensed and is of necessity general in nature.

CHAPTER I

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURE OF THE CONFLICT

a. Environment:

(1) Revolutionary Warfare although not restricted to the so-called underdeveloped areas has largely been waged in former colonial or semi-colonial possessions and other areas having recently achieved national status or independence from totalitarian regimes.

(2) Salient characteristics of the area of operations have generally been:

(a) Undeveloped resources and industry with a marginal agrarian society based on a quasi feudal or colonial economic system.

(b) Considerable areas of the country that are sparsely populated due to conditions of geography. (Desert, mountain, forest and jungle.)

(c) Inadequate modern transportation, communication facilities and food distribution system.

(d) Marginal or low standard of living for the majority of the population.

(e) Periodic crop failure with accompanying famine or conditions of acute privation.

(f) High illiteracy rate, lack of educational institutions, hospitals and sanitation facilities.

(g) Majority of the wealth, industry and land concentrated in the hands of a small privileged class and/or foreign interests.

(h) Unstable government and immature political development.

(i) Widespread graft and corruption in civil government, military establishment, police organization and political parties.

(j) Professionally substandard military and police establishments characterized by poor morale, organization, leadership, training, equipment and pay.

b. Nature of Conflict:

(1) Revolutionary Warfare is a total war waged throughout the country employing political, psychological, economic and military offensives alternately and together.

(2) The participation and support of the mass of the population is sought voluntarily or through the use of force and terror.

(3) No front, rear communication zone or area of a recognized non-combatant/nature exist in the normal military sense. The Rules of Land Warfare and Geneva Convention are generally not observed.

(4) The objective of the communists is not only the defeat and destruction of the government forces and the seizure of power but the destruction of the political, religious, educational system and social economy of the target country.

(5) To achieve their ultimate objective the communists attempt to:

(a) Enlist the active support of the population in attaining their goals by use of attractive reform and revitalization programs with the promise of land, more food, high standard of living, etc. Utilize the rapid growth of the Communist countries as modern industrial powers as an example to be emulated in the target country.

(b) Discredit the government in the eyes of the people as being tyrannical, corrupt and inefficient and representing the interests of the privileged classes to the exclusion of the people.

(c) Paralyze the economy and normal enterprise of the country.

(d) Prove to the population the inability of the government to protect the people, defeat the communists and insure conditions of normalcy by providing the necessary enforcement of law and order.

(e) Force the government to relinquish de-facto control of large portions of the country, its population and resources and confine themselves to purely defensive measures to assure control of key cities and centers of commerce and communications.

(f) Force the government to maintain abnormally large military and police establishments at the expense of the people and provoke the application of harsh and repressive measures to maintain order.

6. Characteristics of the Conflict:

The following operational actions typify the tactics and techniques of Revolutionary Warfare:

(a) Guerrilla operations by armed communist bands in the field and the militant support of civilian subversive groups in urban areas.

(b) Extensive acts of sabotage against public property.

(c) Raids on military and police garrisons, convoys and depots.

(d) Ambush and destruction of public and private transportation systems.

(e) Assassinations, terror bombings, kidnapping, torture and mutilation of prisoners.

(f) House burning, destruction of crops, expropriation of land and forced evacuation of villages.

(g) Payment of extortion ("voluntary gifts") by property owners and merchants for protection of their property.

(h) Bank robbery, counterfeiting and armed robbery to provide funds for the revolution.

(i) Extensive theft, expropriation and "liberation" of arms, food, clothing, medical supplies and marketable goods for barter.

(j) Use of kidnapping and hostage system on members of the families of key government personnel to assure their cooperation with the Reds.

CHAPTER II

POPULATION ATTITUDES

- a. The vast majority of the population in any given target area is initially non-responsible and apathetic to either the aims of the indigenous government and what it stands for or the advocates of the Red Revolution.
- b. Although harboring the traditional distrust of government inherent to the area and dissatisfaction with the social and economic conditions prevalent to the majority, the population has no inclination to revolt. The general desire of the public is to be left to earn its bread and conduct its normal affairs.
- c. The active advocates of Revolutionary warfare constitute a very small but capable and active segment of the population. It is estimated that less than 10% of the total of any population has actively participated in or supported the initial efforts of the Communists in Revolutionary Warfare.
- d. The forces of government and its adherents by choice, necessity or self-interest generally represent less than 20% of the total population. Among these are government officials, civil service, professional military and police establishments, leading politicians, the wealthy and landed class, and the management of industry, commerce banking and mercantile interests.
- e. The uncommitted element of the population (70%) remain to be swayed, persuaded or forced by the Reds into active or tacit support of their campaign.
- f. The communists have achieved power in all instances with the active support of less than 20% of the population in the country concerned, with only 1-2% bearing arms.

CHAPTER III

THE ENEMY, HIS ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION

a. An understanding of some of the essential elements of communism and an appreciation of its true aims and impact on society is basic to the problem.

(1) Communism is not only a political philosophy but a way of life encompassing all aspects of human society. It must be recognized as a dynamic force capable of claiming the fanatic allegiance of intelligent individuals regardless of nationality, race or religion.

(2) The international character and appeal of communism is amply demonstrated by operationally effective communist parties with a disciplined following in every country of the globe conducting both overt and clandestine business in the interest of communist world revolution.

(3) In its 42 years of history the communist party has survived numerous and vigorous repressions and defeats. Its survival and subsequent successes are attributable to its monolithic character, iron discipline, dedication, flexibility, imagination and the ability to learn by their mistakes.

(4) The communists constantly improve their strain by purge and reorganization eliminating the unsuitable, unreliable and vacillating personnel from the party. The successful communist, propaganda to the contrary, is an intelligent and extremely capable individual.

In common with all movements and organizations in the history, the Reds have their quota of "party hacks", however, for purposes of practical consideration they can be eliminated from the operations under consideration.

(5) The basic commandment governing the conduct of communist operations remains that "the means justify the end."

b. Red Command and Control:

(1) Command and control of all operations in Revolutionary Warfare is directed from the central communist party apparatus (The Central) in Moscow or Peiping. An intermediate area central located in a red or neutral country near the border of the target area is sometimes utilized. Major plans, direction and overall objectives are received from the "Central". Wide latitude and decentralization of authority is the norm within the operational area.

(2) An understanding of the true rank and command structure in communist operations is desirable. True rank is based on the individual's position in the control apparatus, not on the position occupied in a communist government or the military rank held.

(3) The following chart indicates a type party control apparatus within an indigenous communist party for the conduct of guerrilla/terrorist operations.

(SCHEMATIC)



c. Description of activities of principal categories of party personnel follows:

(1) Activists: Carefully selected indigenous personnel with long experience in the communist party and conspiratorial life who have demonstrated outstanding leadership and organizational ability. These personnel are educated, schooled and frequently have resided within the Soviet Union or Communist China for extended periods. Personnel serve lengthy apprenticeships in a wide variety of tasks abroad in other areas including espionage, party organization, labor union activities, guerrilla and terrorist operations. The majority hold military rank of general in the Red Army of the USSR or Communist China and possess Soviet or Chinese citizenship. Generally one to three activists are assigned to a target area. Major division of responsibilities among activists are generally regional with one designated as the overall commander.

(2) Organizers: Selected indigenous personnel of wide experience in the communist party. Many have received special schooling in the USSR or China. Generally several organizers will be assigned to each activist. Primary responsibility is assigned to each organizer for a major field of activity such as industrial workers, peasantry, students, military police and civil service. The organizer's mission is to recruit, organize and train communist party cells and cadres in the assigned area of activity to carry out operational missions of the revolution. Organizers are often candidate activists.

(3) Specialists (Technos): May be indigenous or non-indigenous to the area of operations. Generally of long experience in communist party activity, they are imported as required for specific technical tasks such as communication, interrogations, counter-intelligence, military organizations, tactics, guerrilla warfare, assassinations and kidnapping of important personages, party purges and other specialized activities. Specialists are often responsible for the conduct of schooling and training cadres as well as performance of operational tasks.

(4) Cadres: Specially selected indigenous communists, trained generally in the area of operations for the assumption of command and as deputies and subordinate leaders, under the activists and organizers and perform liaison activities. They serve as deputies and subordinate leaders, under the activists and organizers and perform liaison activities.

(5) Agents: Specially selected and trained indigenous communists targeted for penetration of key government and civil institutions to carry out intelligence and subversion missions; agents generally work under the supervision of organizers and activists.

(6) Party Members: The rank and file constitute selected indigenous personnel who have demonstrated ability in their individual fields of endeavor. Party members are generally organized in cells of five persons responsible to a cell leader. Individual members of the cell

are usually unaware of the composition and membership of other cells. Operations and liaison are generally carried out through a series of personal cutouts. Every attempt is made by the communists to limit party membership to a hard core minority.

(7) Supporters and Fellow Travelers: Constitute that element of the indigenous population who are non-party members actively engaged in the support of the communist party. Included in this group are generally the majority of the people supporting the Red cause. Less than 3% of a given population could be expected to constitute the communist party membership. Another 7% could be expected to constitute the support element.

(8) Apparent inconsistencies in relative and real rank and positions in the revolutionary movement in reality provide a modicum of flexibility and a considerable degree of security control considering the nature of the operations. The guerrilla battalion commander may be a party member but he takes party direction and such other orders as necessary from his deputy or intelligence officer when the situation requires. The military subordinate is a party organizer or cadre whose primary activities are non-military but who is readily available to advise or control the military where necessary in the party's interest. The military chief functions as the field leader carrying out his normal military tasks with a minimum of guidance from his party superior (commissar) except in matters effecting party doctrine and policy.

d. Organization of a typical indigenous communist party is indicated as follows:

(See following page)

General Committee

Regional Bureaus	(General Geographic Divisions of the Country	Military High Command
		(Largely exists in name only. Is generally the title assumed by the central committee when issuing directives to the Armed Forces)
Provincial Committees	(State Level)	
District Committee	(Major Geographic Divisions of the State)	
Branch Committees	(Country Level)	Mobile Guerrilla Bns Regts & Brigades
		Flying Columns
		(When organized come under appropriate level committee as decided by the central committee)
Civilian Support Organizations	Local Guerrilla CO's and Platoons	
Home Guards		
Couriers		
Intelligence		
Supply		

Note: Variations on the above organization will be noted in each country considered.

(1) Central Committee: The Central Committee is composed of 10-15 top-ranking communist executives (activists and organizers) under the direction of the Secretary General (chief activist). The committee rarely assembles and the actual policy direction emanates from the Politbureau consisting of 3-4 members (the activists) including the Secretary General. The Secretary General may issue directives as appropriate in the name of the Politbureau or Central Committee based on previous policy decisions.

(2) The Military High Command. (See chart page 12)

(3) The Regional Bureaus: Directives and decisions by the Central Committee are passed to the Regional Bureaus for transmission and application as appropriate to the Provincial Committees. The Regional Bureau is controlled by an activist, assisted by other party personnel. Generally limited to a total of 5-7 personnel.

(4) Provincial Committee: Performs essentially the same command and communication function at the state level. In some instances the provincial committees are only formed in the movement's advanced state of development or as otherwise required. Control is generally exercised by an organizer. In size its personnel seldom exceeds five.

(5) District Committee: Each provincial committee has under its control a number of district committees (4-7) according to geography of the area concerned. The District Committee is generally controlled by an organizer in the position of Party Secretary. When the Provincial Committee is not formed the District Committee functions under the direct control of the Regional Bureau. The District Committee is the main functional level of the communist party. It formulates and implements plans and policy at the operational level in conformance with party directives and directs combat operations. This committee constitutes the nerve center and command post of the revolutionary warfare field elements. Size usually approximates 5-10 personnel.

(6) Branch Committees: The Branch Committees work under the direction of the District Committees--each district averaging 4 branch committees. Branch committees consist of 3-5 individuals. The Branch Committee controls both the civilian support organizations and the local guerrilla companies and separate platoons. The Branch Committee is generally controlled by a cadreman. The Branch Committee is the highest level at which non-party members may normally be encountered.

(7) Civilian Support Organizations: The bulk of the communist numerical strength lies in these organizations. A wide variety of support elements are incorporated at this level. The majority are constituted from non-party personnel although some may be candidates or on a probationary status. The majority are members of front organizations, communist youth groups or just citizens partial to the red cause. Party members of local cells fill key positions and ramrod the operations. Home guards, couriers, liaison, intelligence, propaganda, supply, recruiting, communication elements all constitute the support organization sometimes called the Armed

work forces. Members wear no identifying uniforms and normally function under the cover of legitimate occupations and maintain, as far as possible, a clandestine cover for their operations except when attached directly to guerrilla/terrorist military units. Members are armed when the job requires. The presence of women in all positions in the red organization is normal. The support organizations are the main physical link between the guerrilla/terrorist military organizations and the communist high command.

e. Organization of the Militant Arm of Revolutionary Warfare; Principal elements of the communist armed forces in the areas under consideration are: Armed bands, flying columns and home guards.

(1) Armed guerrilla/terrorist band-type units varying in size are organized in platoons, and companies based in the hills, jungle or forests of the area. These units are recruited primarily from the locale of operations and serve as full time regular soldiers. Personnel generally constitute a relatively high ratio of party members to non-party personnel. These units normally conduct operations within given geographical areas from which they are controlled by the Branch Committees. Units normally arm, equip and clothe themselves by the conduct of raids and subsequent to initial arming require little outside ordnance support. Subsistence and medical support is provided primarily by the support organizations. Units conduct training, establish supply caches, and maintain surveillance, reconnaissance and security guard activities normal to small units when not engaged in active operations. Operations are generally planned in advance and receive the approval of the committee. Communications with armed bands are normally maintained via couriers, letter drops, or designated point of contact personnel resident in the locale. Radio and telephones are seldom available to units at this level. Several units are frequently assembled temporarily for the conduct of larger operations in adjacent areas and then return to their normal locale. Personnel generally receive no regular pay but on occasion receive cash grants or other gifts. Families of guerrillas are supported as necessary by the local party organizations. The individual's term of service is for the length of hostilities or when released. Discipline is severe and the unit commander has the power of life or death over his personnel. Disobedience of orders, theft, desertion, leaving a wounded comrade, looting, rape, or the killing of civilians without orders, are all usually punished by a summary court on the spot and an arbitrary death sentence. Leaves and visits to family or friends are strictly controlled. Field medical care is generally very primitive or restricted to first aid. Living conditions are harsh and food supplies and shelter are generally marginal. Troops are generally armed with a variety of relatively modern weapons with a high preponderance of sub-machine guns, shotguns and carbines. Lack of standardization is normal. Automatic rifles of the Bren and BAR types are popular and widely used for fire support. Conventional bolt action rifles are substituted when more desirable arms cannot be obtained. Pistols, knives and grenades are carried when available, by all ranks. Light machine guns are generally used only by company sized or larger formations. Grenade launchers, mortars of the 60mm, Minewerfer and knee

mortar type are widely used. Heavier mortars are usually found only in larger guerrilla formations. Ammunition is generally in short supply and is carefully conserved. Troops are sometimes uniformed in partial military attire, with red star arm bands, cap insignia, etc. The use of captured government uniforms of both military and police to assist in deception and surprise is a common practice.

(2) Mobile Columns: (Flying Columns). Larger guerrilla formations similar to the Armed Bands (Plt and Cos) above; organized in battalions, regiments, or brigades (200-500) are established and maintained under the control of District or Provincial Committees when possible. Units are not based on any specific locality but operate over wide areas. When not engaged in active operations units are subdivided for billeting in several districts. Radio and telephonic communications are sometimes utilized by these units. Heavy mortars and standard types of light machine guns are generally encountered in these units. Staff organization and training is generally good. Staffs seldom exceed three (3) individuals and generally include a Political Commissar, Operations and Intelligence Officer and an Intendance Officer. Liaison personnel from higher and lower echelons are assigned when necessary but are not considered to be a part of the staff.

(3) Home Guards:

(a) In each area where communist operations are conducted attempts are made to organize Home Guard units.

(b) Organized in sections they vary widely in size according to the locality (average 10-30 personnel).

(c) Based on villages, towns or settlements they constitute a "Red Militia" available for part-time military activities or operations of short duration.

(d) Generally employed as scouts, security screening and lookouts for raiding bands operating in their areas, they sometimes perform small scale raids and armed robberies in adjacent communities to requisition supplies, divert attention from other operations and apply pressure to local inhabitants.

(e) These forces are generally only partially equipped with firearms.

(f) The Home Guards operate under the control of the Branch Committee unless attached to guerrilla units for specific operations and are classified as a support organization.

f. Tactics:

(1) The objective of communists is the seizure of power achieved by:

(a) Gaining the active support of a minority of the population while concurrently securing the passive neutrality of the mass of the population.

(b) Destruction of the government and its institutions by denying it the support of the populace and concurrently defeating and destroying its punitive arms and control system by a combination of terrorism, subversion and military force.

(c) Achieving the de-facto control of the country by forcing the government to disperse its forces and assume the defensive retaining only the cities and major towns under its control and those locales physically occupied by its field forces.

(2) Phasing of operations: The major phasing periods of operations are:

(a) Conspiratory Phase: Initiated by activation of red party apparatus within target country, includes all basic preparatory actions prior to the overt bid for power. Extends from an indefinite period until the internal and international situation indicates a favorable "D" Day.

(b) Initiation Phase: Usually a relatively short period of time during which the Red's surface portions of their forces in the form of strikes, "peace drives," "popular fronts", "election activity," heavy propaganda outputs, student demonstrations and "Freedom Movements." Generally coupled with outbreaks of violence and provocation of punitive action by police against mobs, strikes, etc. Often is coupled to coincide with the actions of legitimate national freedom movements and revolts against tyrannical or unpopular governments. If this phase proves to be premature or abortive, the reds retire to the conspiratorial phase and await another opportunity.

(c) Revolutionary Phase: Incorporates the entire period from the formalization of overt hostilities until the reds have secured power. Generally this phase can be subdivided into two subordinate periods: (1) Period of Revolt: Extending from the initiation of the uprising to the defeat of the government initially in power. (2) Defeat of the Counter-Revolutionaries: Covers the period from the overthrow of the initial government through any coalition and interim national governments until the reds have secured the sole occupancy of the driver's seat in the political arena and exercise major punitive authority. This phase includes the period of suppression of any armed remnants of the previous regime or other non-communist elements resisting the "people's will."

(d) Consolidation Phase: Elimination of the existing political and social structures and the substitution of communist institutions and the "classless society." These actions are initiated concurrently with other phases and culminate in the destruction of the former socio-economic structure.

(3) Tactical Scenarios: The following schematic listing of communist activities and resultant conditions cover developments to be expected in the areas indicated within the target country. Volume of the activity and incident rates will be dictated by the capability of the reds to implement the action coupled with the tempo and time phasing called for in their campaign. In the majority of historical cases these problems appear first in traditionally "unsettled" areas coupled with a rash of incidents in the larger urban areas and progress rapidly to cover other portions of the country. The general application and continuation of the activities listed on a wholesale scale will without immediate resourceful positive counteraction by the government result in the fall of the regime in power.

(a) Urban, industrial and commercial population center activity:

1. Paralyzation of industry and commerce through strikes, slowdowns and sabotage.

2. Disruption of public and commercial transportation and communications by strikes, sabotage, raids, terror bombings and fear campaigns spread by rumor.

3. Special terrorist activities directed at:

a. Selected government, military and police officials at all echelons and their families and relatives. Includes representatives of the press and radio and influential citizens not in public life. Incorporates threats of violence and death unless the subject "comes to terms" or leaves the country. Implementation is carried out by beatings, kidnapping, assassination, mutilation, arson and bombing against the person or property of the subject or members of his family.

b. Military, police and government stations, garrisons and patrols. Developed in the form of ambushes, bombing, raids, sabotage and general harassing tactics and attacks.

c. Similar attacks to b above on public press and radio facilities coupled with technical interference in curtailing supply and newsprint, radio jamming, and sabotage of mechanical facilities.

d. Bombing and arson attacks on government buildings, banks, leading commercial firms and the public mails.

4. General Terror Campaign: Includes arson, bombings, machine gunning in public places, such as bars, night clubs, theaters, bus and railroad terminals. Sometimes accompanied by spasmodic roof-top sniping incidents.

5. Rumor and Propaganda Campaigns: Widespread rumor campaigns embodying derogatory and disruptive themes to public morale such as the flight of the government, its imminent collapse, red victories, graft and corruption, character assassination, murder of innocent people by the police, shortages of food, devaluation of the currency, cancellation of government bonds and reputed defection abroad of key government and banking officials with national funds are integral parts of the Red psychological effort.

6. Provocateur Incidents: Utilizing police or military uniforms and vehicles red action groups of terrorists carry out a systematic campaign of terror to discredit the government and arouse public indignation by the beating, kidnapping and assassination of left wing or other government opposition groups. In some cases publicly known or suspected communists who are expendable are "Martyrized for the cause" by the reds in this fashion to offer credence to the incidents.

(b) Rural areas activities, including those conducted in small villages, towns and hamlets are generally as follows:

1. Destruction of the government's authority by the assassination, forced evacuation or intimidation and "pacification" of the rural and village government officials, police, merchant class and land owners.

2. Severance and/or control of communications facilities with the urban and regional centers of commerce by sabotage of telegraph and telephone systems, disruption of rail and road traffic by ambushes, sabotage, and temporarily testablished Red Army check points on roads where travelers and cargo are checked and/or diverted from their destination.

3. Temporary seizure of rural villages and seats of commerce by guerrilla units is usually accompanied by the following: The population is assembed and Red proclamations are read announcing the new order. Searches for arms and "government agents" are conducted, public trials are held, the "culprits" executed, taxes in the form of goods and money are collected from the well-to-do. Hostages are sometimes taken from ranks of remaining government supporters and the population is warned that the Red Army is coming or will return and the meanwhile they will be under the scrutiny of the "agent of the people" and will be expected to support the new "People's Government." Reprisals for assistance to the government or lack of cooperation are promised. Land and goods of "government lackeys" executed are often distributed to the population, assisting in the "incrimination" of the populace as a whole as accomplices to the actions of the Reds. The red bands then depart with the promise (threat) of return. Small red elements of the band are sometimes left to continue organization if the circumstances permit. In general the actions of these red bands are scrupulously correct toward the population as a whole. The Reds make every effort to impress the population with the conduct of their troops and their roles as fair but stern

dispensers dispensers of the "people's will". Recruiting of volunteers is also conducted during these operations. Goods and services taken from other than government supporters are paid for. Women and religious personages are not molested. The soldiery circulate with the population passing out small gifts and propaganda tracts, and participate in communal activities. Red military units frequently arrive to assist the peasantry in planting, harvesting, threshing and other activities.

4. Revenues in the form of taxes, goods and cattle flowing to the city are diverted and disrupted whenever possible. Government and private stores, graineries, plantations and processing activities are sabotaged by burning, spoilage and theft. Grain and supplies are often distributed to the local population, providing good will and the ready availability of supply caches for subsequent operations.

5. The following operations described above under urban and industrial areas are also conducted in the rural areas as locally necessary and feasible:

a. Special terrorist operations against government supporters and their families:

b. Propaganda and rumor campaigns.

c. Provocateur incidents.

(c) Activities in sparsely populated areas (jungle, mountain, forest, swamp, etc.) Parallel those of the rural areas with the emphasis on the following:

1. Early achievement of complete physical domination of the area.

2. Garrisoning of relatively large guerrilla formations of the Mobile or Flying Column Type.

3. Establishment of guerrilla training centers, extensive supply caches, hospitals, rest centers, and small arms and munitions, manufacturing and repair facilities.

4. Extensive use of the population (particular primitive groups) as guides, porters, lookouts, and general labor force.

5. Establishment of volume trans-border smuggling operations in arms, supplies and personnel where such sparsely populated areas are located near the national boundaries of the target area.

(d) Activities within the government, military and police establishments and public information media are carried out by the agents and cells established by the communist party during the conspiratorial

phase. Often under deep cover these personnel are assisted and abetted by other personnel recruited by blackmail, graft, anti-regime beliefs and disaffection for personal causes. The insertion or promotion of these personnel into key jobs is held to be an objective of high priority by the Red High Command (Central Committee). Their operations cover a wide area of activities including but not limited to the following:

1. Formulation and implementation of ineffective or erroneous policy.
2. Provision of intelligence for the benefit of all phases of operations.
3. Spreading of rumors, disaffection and loss of morale in all government elements. Incitation of mutiny of military and police units and their defection to the communists.
4. Issuance of false, misleading, delayed and misdirected orders, reports and directives.
5. Sabotage of communications.
6. Earmarking of capable government personnel for the special attention of terrorists.
7. Incitation of provocateur actions damaging to the government's positions through official channels.
8. Maneuvering communist personnel or sympathizers in office into key positions where government operations may be hamstrung and open collaboration and assistance afforded to the guerrilla units in the field or the subversive apparatus.
9. Destruction or loss of files and intelligence reports on Red operations and personnel.
10. Delay or misdirection in shipment of supplies, reinforcements, pay, etc. to government forces. "Official or bureaucratic sabotage."

CHAPTER IV
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO THE SUPPRESSION OF COMMUNIST
TERRORIST/GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

a. The basic causes of revolutionary warfare are seated in the politico-psychological and socio-economic instability of the country.

b. The guerrilla/terrorist movement is a result not the cause of the problem.

c. The communist ability to activate and exploit a population lie in serious basic problems within the country that have not been resolved. The following written by the leader of a target country is quoted to indicate the typical conditions prevailing.

"Social-economic conditions have become worse for the people since 195_ except for a small favored group which continues to prosper. Living costs continue to rise, employer-labor disputes continue, production continues to fall, and the question of veterans' benefits remains a problem. Even independence has not solved the problem of famine.

The government administration is ill-run and its ranks are swollen until they are not capable of efficient action. Officials are numerous but their quality is low. Corruption permeates the government and incompetent amateurs occupy important posts. Party and family favoritism have a tight grip on the government. There is no clear separation of powers among the various administrative ministries. Orderly administration is a prime condition, not only for any politico-psychological and socio-economic undertaking but also for political security within the country. To make the administration good and healthy will require a great deal of time and effort; it cannot be achieved by miracles. In this demoralizing atmosphere, spiritual standards and norms of decency are lowered. The evaluation of good and bad is more and more controlled by emotional desires. These symptoms are observed by the leaders themselves. Therefore, the solution of the problem depends in the first place on these leaders applying the rules to themselves. One cannot expect improvement of the basic problems of security, order and peace in one or two years."

d. The anti-guerrilla terrorist war is an attempt at pacification. It consists largely of constructive efforts while a conventional conflict is largely destructive. The military contributes but cannot win the conflict without extensive changes and reforms to eliminate the causes of dissension and revolt.

e. Unless the government achieves an ascendancy of ideology and aims over those offered by the guerrilla/terrorists and convinces the people of their intent to implement extensive changes and reform the forces of revolutionary war will eventually win. Positive action by the government to publicize and implement their political, socio-economic and psychological reform programs are essential conditions to the initiation of successful military operations against the guerrilla/terrorists, and are the foundation on which a military victory must be achieved.

f. The anti-guerrilla/terrorist operations must aim at severing the enemy from their base within the people, and must, therefore, emphasize political, psychological and economic actions. The guerrilla/terrorists must be opposed by his own tactics, consisting of offensive actions carried out in a mobile flexible fashion. A military operation alone has never been shown to extinguish guerrilla opposition of a significant nature.

g. All anti-terrorist/guerrilla operations must be conducted within the framework of an overall national plan in which the objectives, forces and methods of implementation are specified. Appropriate roles, missions and tasks for the political, economic, military, police and press media of the country are necessary. The objective cannot be achieved solely by the elimination of guerrilla bands.

h. (1) To implement the control and direction of the national plan Joint Commands (Pacification Committees) are established at the national, regional or provincial, county and village levels.

(2) Pacification committees consist of representatives of the civil government, military, police, national security, intelligence organs, economic and psychological agencies of the government at the aforementioned levels.

(3) The commanders of the major commands are selected by the Chief of State based on leadership ability, reliability, intelligence and freedom from conflicting partisan interests.

(4) Staffs are constituted from selected representatives of appropriate governmental agencies listed above at the levels concerned.

(5) Wide latitude and authority is delegated to the commander and the resources and personnel of the area concerned are placed at his disposal.

i. Broad general direction and centralized control is exercised at the national level with maximum decentralization and emphasis placed on operational freedom and initiative at the regional and local levels. Maximum observance of this exercise of freedom of initiative and decentralized operational command control is absolutely necessary to successful and swift exploitation of localized opportunities and varied circumstances.

j. Forces utilized by the government include the following:

- (1) Regular military units.
- (2) National police or civil guard units.
- (3) Municipal and local police.
- (4) Civilian self-defense forces at local levels.
- (5) National and state intelligence and security elements.
- (6) Special police as necessary.

(7) Agents, informants, "galvanized guerrillas" and other disaffected or captured red personnel.

(8) Press, radio and public information organization.

k. Principals of operation and implementation incorporate the following concurrent activities:

(1) Assumption and continuation of the offensive at all levels. Use of positive measures and the avoidance of reliance on purely passive and static defensive measures. Stress is placed on the military qualities of aggressiveness, mobility and flexibility, coupled with extensive, accurate and timely intelligence coverage of the area of operations.

(2) Practice of economy of force employing suitable arms and equipment and utilizing the guerrillas/terrorists own weapons and tactics to destroy him by:

(a) Maintenance of continued military pressure in the form of attacks, raids, ambushes and pursuit to keep the enemy in a constant state of alarm for his own security preventing his rest, resupply and implementation of offensive operations.

(b) Infiltration of guerrilla/terrorist organizations and the establishment of extensive informant nets within the population.

(c) The following practices are avoided:

1. The policy of widespread assignment of small military detachments to essential defensive tasks as garrison, rail and road sentries subject to defeat in detail.

2. The dispatch of large size (regiment and division) conventional units to destroy guerrillas, unless the guerrilla/terrorists have organized and are utilizing similar formations and such units have been brought to bay.

3. Waste of military manpower involved in manpower saturation tactics practiced by simply garrisoning large military forces in an area of guerrilla/terrorist operations in hopes that the physical presence of troops will deter enemy operations.

4. Expenditure of manpower and energy in large-scale terrain sweeps or drive tactics unless the enemy has been decisively defeated in a specific locale and the objective is pursuit.

(d) The general movement of military and police forces out of the garrisons and cities and off the roads and trails into the realm of the guerrilla/terrorist units in continuing all weather operations is established as a basic element in the concept of operations.

(e) The attack and destruction of guerrilla/terrorist bases in sparsely populated areas by suitably tailored military and police forces is undertaken as soon as possible and is vigorously pressed to a successful conclusion in a continuing all weather campaign.

(f) Intensive psychological campaigns aimed at severing the support or toleration of the populace for the guerrilla/terrorists.

(g) Maximum effort to induce defection in the ranks of the guerrilla/terrorist through offers of amnesties and "resettlement" as well as psychological operations aimed at separation of the Red command from the rank and file.

(h) Establishment of self defense forces of civilians at the local village and hamlet level.

(i) Material aid and assistance to devastated areas in form of food, medical assistance, and rehabilitation and reconstruction.

(j) Resettlement of evacuated areas with reliable populations adequately supported by the government.

(k) Initiation of needed reforms in the more obvious problem areas accompanied by removal of corrupt and inefficient officials and the arrest of red collaborators at all levels.

(l) Institution of strict controls on travel, personnel, documentation, firearms, explosives, munitions and export-import licenses.

(m) Avoidance of policies of reprisal or unduly restrictive or harrassing actions interfering with the normal activities of the population.

CHAPTER V

U. S. INTERESTS

a. The U. S. interest in the target areas lies primarily in preventing further communist expansion by maintaining stable popularly supported non-communist governments in power in the countries of allies, friends, and the so-called neutral or uncommitted nations.

b. In several areas the military forces of these governments constitute major elements of the regional U. S. - allied defense effort. The preoccupation of these forces in combating internal guerrilla/terrorist operations effectively denies their use in opposing external overt aggression.

c. It is neither politically feasible or operationally practicable to entertain the use of U. S. conventional forces in an intervention role within these numerous and widespread areas for the following reasons.

(1) U. S. national policy preventing military intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states unless threatened by exterior invasion.

(2) Lack of adequate U. S. forces and the general unsuitability of foreign troops in combating internal uprisings.

(3) Resistance of indigenous populations to foreign (U. S.) military intervention.

(4) International implications of "gunboat diplomacy" and its lack of public support abroad and within the U. S.

d. The problem of suppressing guerrilla/terrorist operations is essentially an internal problem of the country concerned and the resolution of the basic issues and the application of appropriate remedial actions must remain in the hands of the indigenous government.

e. The indigenous government faced with revolutionary warfare on a day-by-day basis, however, often finds it difficult to objectively analyze the situation and recognize the sources of the guerrilla/terrorist strength and initiate appropriate counter-action.

f. The U. S. should be prepared to offer assistance and advice at the request of such governments. Scope of such aid should include the following and be considered an economy of force measure.

(1) Assistance in preparing plans.

(2) Organization and training of forces.

(3) Advice in the conduct of anti-guerrilla/terrorist operations.

(4) Furnishing equipment.

(5) Assistance in preparing psychological operations.

(6) Material relief assistance in the form of food, medical supplies, construction materials and equipment.

(7) Assistance in rehabilitating devastated areas.

g. The urgency and general circumstances that surround requests for assistance in combating guerrilla/terrorist operations dictate prompt and positive action.

h. Long range programs and general assistance aid while useful in achieving ultimate goals are largely unproductive and unresponsive to the immediate threat of Revolutionary Warfare placing a communist or communist oriented government in power within the target area.

i. The time element is vital in the suppression of guerrilla/terrorist operations. Prompt remedial action in the advanced conspirational or initiation phase will assist materially in the shortening of the conflict. While the complete suppression of Revolutionary Warfare is generally achieved in a period of years, not months, the overall length of the conflict is often determined by the promptness and nature of the remedial measures applied in the initial months of conflict.

j. U. S. Advisor Assistance: Teams of suitably qualified U. S. military and civilian personnel appropriately trained for the areas of operations should be provided at the compatible levels of indigenous pacification commands to advise and assist the indigenous government. Wherever feasible and possible utilization of U. S. personnel presently in the area should be made.

(1) Military Personnel: U. S. Army Special Forces Teams, Psychological Warfare teams and appropriate specialist representation of civil affairs, counter-intelligence and police corps personnel should provide military representatives on command levels and constitute the basis for working teams, with their indigenous counterparts.

(2) Civilian Personnel: Department of State, U. S. Operations Mission (USOM) personnel should provide civilian representation in respective fields on a similar basis.

(3) Schematic type organization and functions at various levels depicted as follows:

	(a) <u>U. S. Advisor Aid</u>	<u>Indigenous Gov't. Command</u>
National Level:	U. S. Country Team Advisors to National Pacification Committee. Ambassador and appropriate members of U. S. military and civilian agencies.	National Pacification Committee Chief of State Ministers and Appropriate Government Departmental Heads.

U. S. Advisor Aid

(Executive Advisor Committee appointed by Ambassador advises National Executive Sub-committee).

Indigenous Gov't Command

(Executive subcommittee appointed by Chief of State carries out direction and control).

(b) U. S. Advisor Aid

Indigenous Gov't

Regional
Level:

U. S. advisors to regional pacification committee. Consists of senior advisors and commanders of following U. S. teams:

Regional pacification committee. Military, police and civil government units

U. S. Army Special Forces Cmd Team (FB)
U. S. Army Special Forces Operational Team (FA)
U. S. Army Psychological Warfare Team
U. S. Army Intelligence Team
U. S. Army Civil Affairs or USOM Team

(U. S. elements advise indigenous counterparts, conduct courses of instruction in organization training and equipment and provide traveling survey of regional operations).

(c) Local Level: Organization and implementation of U. S. assistance at the local level will vary according to the intensity of operations. In active areas of guerrilla/terrorist operations the presence of appropriate U. S. military advisor teams at the operational level is necessary to effectively and realistically advise in the conduct of organization and operations until such time as the indigenous forces have succeeded in achieving successful progress in the suppression activity. A type organization in a "High Incident Area" is indicated as follows:

U. S.

Indigenous


U. S. Advisors to local pacification Committee: Senior advisor and commanders of U. S. teams.

Local pacification committee and military police and self-defense forces.

U. S. Army Special Forces teams (FA)
USOM/CA team as appropriate
Psychological Warfare Officer/NCP Advisor
Intelligence Advisor.

Assist in organizing and provide training and advice in conduct of operations of local military, police and self-defense units.

(4) Type organization chart for U. S. advisory function is shown on page 32.



CHAPTER VI

ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

The conduct of punitive operations in the guerrilla/terrorist suppression campaign is primarily a military activity supported by police, para-military unit, and civil agencies.

a. Roles and Missions.

(1) Army: Performs primary role of seeking out and destroying the guerrilla/terrorist military formations at all levels. Provides units to serve under the command of pacification committees at appropriate levels. Provides training, organizational and logistical support to other elements as required.

(2) Naval, Air Forces and Border Guards: Provide coastal, air and border security as necessary. Perform logistical support, surveillance, resupply and training missions as appropriate. Units are assigned or attached to and controlled by pacification committees at appropriate levels.

(3) National Police or Civil Guard units:

(a) Description: Uniformed, armed police personnel generally organized on a platoon basis for country-wide operations.

(b) Roles: Perform police and internal security duties in non-urban areas. Exercise law enforcement, intelligence and counter-subversive duties as directed by pacification committee at appropriate level. Support Army units in punitive actions and relieve Army units of internal security duties in pacified areas.

(4) Municipal and Local Police: Armed uniformed civilian police function in normal law enforcement mission and support operations of local pacification committee.

(5) Civilian Self-Defense Forces: Armed, non-uniformed rural militia, organized at the town, village and hamlet level and trained by the Army to combat indigenous dissident activity, protect local targets, provide guides, surveillance and local contacts and otherwise support operations in the area. Note: The importance of the role played by well-trained and organized local self-defense forces should be emphasized. The basis for a large proportion of the punitive actions conducted will be dependent on intelligence, combat contracts or other services provided by these forces. The psychological effect of these local civilian inhabitants in the role of part-time soldiers capable of preventing casual communists occupation of the outlying villages and localities materially assists the government in securing the support of the population as a whole. Former military and police service personnel should be utilized to form cadres for those units whenever feasible.

(6) National Intelligence/Security Agencies: Perform intelligence operations against guerrilla/terrorist organizations and counter-subversion/intelligence functions within government and civil population as directed by appropriate level pacification committees.

(7) Special Police: Recruited and trained for special task. Often possess special skills or aptitudes. These personnel are recruited from the indigenous population and are assigned and utilized as required.

(a) Trackers

(b) Hunters-poachers

(c) Foresters or game keepers

(d) Dog trainers and handlers

(e) Primitive indigenous personnel from sparsely populated areas with specialized area knowledge or utilization.

(f) Factory, mine, plantation/ranch and railroad guards.
Organized to control installation self-defense elements in critical facilities.

(8) Special Intelligence Personnel: Utilized for intelligence, counter-subversion and Psychological purposes; includes but not restricted to:

(a) Agents

(b) Informants

(c) "Galvanized Guerrillas" (reformed enemy personnel working for the government)

(d) Smugglers

(e) Black market operators

(f) Captured red personnel

(g) Defected red personnel

(9) Hunter-killer Teams:

(a) Description: Specially selected and trained teams composed of volunteers from area military and police units augmented by trackers and/or guides. Personnel wear local indigenous civilian clothes or nondescript military attire and possess items of Red insignia on uniforms for use when appropriate. Heavily armed and lightly equipped teams operate in the "brush" without physical contact with the indigenous population for periods of 1-3 weeks. Teams establish daily radio contact with local base and are supplied by cache or air drop. Teams are infiltrated into area of operations (land, sea or air) and controlled by local pacification committee. (Size 5-15 personnel). Tracker and patrol or sentry dogs are frequently employed by the team.

(b) Mission: Hunt down and destroy elements of local guerrilla/terrorist armed bands. Establish and maintain contact with large formations until arrival of reinforcements. Harass and disrupt guerrilla/terrorist units by ambush and capture of couriers, scouts and small groups, booby trap trails and camp areas, destroy supply caches and maintain surveillance over suspected guerrilla rendezvous and assembly areas.

(c) The following type team organization is offered as an example only. Composition will vary considerably with area of operation. Organization of a type 12 man hunter-killer team:

<u>Job</u>	<u>Type Personnel</u>
Team Leader	Army Officer
Asst. Leader	Senior Army Sgt
Intelligence (NCO & Assist.)	National Police Sgt
Intelligence Interrogation & local indigenous contact	National Police Patrolman
Radio Operator	Army enlisted
Medic	Army enlisted
Tracker	Special police
Dog Handler	Special police
Action element (4)	Army enlisted
2 Tracker dogs	
2 Patrol/sentry dogs	

(10) Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Company.

(a) The Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Company is a well-balanced team capable of delivering both aerial and ground fire. It has an armed aerial reconnaissance platoon, aerial infantry platoon, air mobile in armed helicopters, a high proportion of automatic weapons and possesses a ground-to-ground and an air-to-ground capability utilizing machine guns, aerial cannon and rockets. The organic helicopters permit highly maneuverable mounted attack with reduced vulnerability to small arms fire delivered by ground elements. Because of its mobility, firepower and flexibility, the aerial combat reconnaissance company readily lends itself as a valuable adjunct to the type of combat conducted in anti-terrorist/guerrilla operations.

(b) Organization is as follows:

1. Co Hq: Tactical Command and Control

2. Aerial Recon Platoon

3 Recon flights of 4 armed helicopters each.

Total 12. Crew - 2 per helicopter. Functions of the platoon are aerial reconnaissance, security and the destruction of enemy forces. Each helicopter crew is capable of independent operation or in any combination of from one to four helicopters. Normal employment will be in teams of two.

3. Aero Infantry Platoon, The aero infantry platoon consists of a platoon headquarters, three battle teams and a fire support team, mounted in three armed transport helicopters and a support copter armed with MG's and rockets. Mission close with enemy and destroy by fire and maneuver.

4. Aero Weapons Platoon: Consists of three flights of two helicopters each. Total six copters, Three copters are armed with 30 and 50 caliber machine guns and a 1.5"-3.5" aerial rocket system. All are armed with 20 mm cannon and a 4"-6" rocket system. The mission of the Aero Weapons Platoon is to provide air-to-ground fire support.

5. Headquarters and Service Platoon performs administrative and service support to the company.

(c) Because of the technical training and equipment involved, considerable time is necessary to train this type of unit and it may not be available in the early stages of a suppression campaign unless previously organized.

(d) Provisional units similar to the above may be improvised as an interim emergency measure. Utilizing transport helicopters available and substituting fixed wing-light aircraft for the reconnaissance and fire support helicopters operations may be conducted while regular units are being formed, equipped and trained. Such provisional units will, of necessity, operate with considerably less efficiency and flexibility than the regular all-helicopter unit.

(e) The Aero Combat Reconnaissance companies will normally be assigned to the Regional Pacification Committee and attached in whole or part for specific missions to local committees or regional task forces.

b. Organization and Functions

(1) Command and operational control of combat units:

(a) Pacification Committees at the national and regional levels determine the assignment of all forces.

(b) The major portion of combat actions occur at the local level and are directed by the local pacification committee.

(c) The regional pacification committees direct the local committees, but only assume direct command of military forces in the conduct of operations against large military formations of guerrilla/terrorists whose activities encompass several subordinate local areas and are beyond the capability of forces assigned at that level. Special commands may be established by the region for the conduct of such missions.

(2) Assignment of Forces: Appropriate forces will be assigned to meet the specific requirements of the area involved. Wide variations will exist within any given area. General considerations are:

(a) Army units suitable for general assignment include infantry, airborne, armored cavalry and engineer units.

(b) Assignment or employment of forces in units larger than battalion size will be the exception. Operations will generally be conducted by squad platoon or company-sized formations.

(c) The employment of artillery, tank or motorized units in an active role in suppression activities, will be usually restricted to infrequent use in large-scale operations.

(d) Military aviation, including fixed and rotary wing aircraft, plays an important role in reconnaissance liaison, surveillance, fire support, communications, resupply and evacuation.

(3) Schematic type local pacification committee task force structure (area one to two county size):

(a) Type local pacification committee task force:

2 Rifle Co's Inf Regt Army

1 National Police Platoon

4 Hunter-killer Teams

1 Special Police Section (10 men)
Trackers and Dog handlers. Kennel
of trackers and sentry/patrol
dogs.

1 Transportation Corps Truck Section
(12 trucks)

4 Self-Defense Platoons (18-30 men each located in
villages and towns)

3 Self-Defense Sections (8-15 men each located in
3 local hamlets)

Aircraft are assigned as required for specific
missions.

(b) Type local pacification committee command and staff:

Commander - Battalion executive officer of the infantry
battalion furnishing 2 rifle companies.

Deputy - Public prosecutor of the district government
(reserve officer)

District Representative - Mayor of town in the area,
represents local civil agencies
and populace.

Personnel Officer - 1st Lt, Inf Bn.

Intelligence Officer - National Police Captain

Asst Intel Officer - Civilian from Nat'l Security Agency


Operations Officer - Captain, Infantry Battalion

Asst Operations Officer and Air Liaison Officer

Public Policy and Information Officer - Civilian or
military representative of Psycho-
logical Operations

Supply Officer - 1st Lt, Infantry Officer

(c) Schematic Deployment of Pacification committee forces
in a type locale: (on following page).



LEGEND

ARMY

NATIONAL POLICE

HUNTER-KILLER TEAM

SELF-DEFENSE UNIT

SPECIAL CONSTABLE

PACIFICATION COMMITTEE HQ

INDICATES PATROL ACTIVITY

ROADS

(4) Type task allocation of local pacification committee task force (see sketch schematic deployment).

(a) One rifle company in reserve at pacification base. Exploits, contacts or counters enemy action. Supports national police platoon in search and security operations.

(b) One rifle company on patrol operation from temporary CP with two platoons engaged in actual patrol operations and the company (-) in reserve to exploit patrol contacts. Company remains on patrol duty for periods of 5-7 days and is relieved by the reserve company. Patrols operate with trackers. Trail dogs and sentry patrol dogs are employed where feasible.

(c) Two hunter-killer teams are on patrol in assigned areas. Duration of patrol 2-3 weeks. Two HK teams are held in reserve for exploitation action and relief of teams on patrol. Trackers and dogs are attached as in (b) above.

(d) Special police are assigned to patrol elements as trackers and dog handlers, as required. Reserve is maintained at PC Base.

(e) Self-Defense Units: Man local outposts in villages and towns, engage in periodic around-the-clock perimeter patrols of the community and maintain local alert force available for defense missions. One Army NCO and 2 National Police assigned to each platoon size SD unit. Sentry/patrol dogs when available are attached to self-defense units.

(f) National Police Platoon: Supervises convoy and road traffic security. Operates search and check points. Conducts house raids and searches. Conducts interrogation of suspects and operates local confinement facilities. Generally operate in 3 man teams supported by military personnel as required. Dogs are employed as necessary, for sentry and trailing purposes.

(5) The local pacification committee exercises command from a central command post base in the area. The local Pacification Committee Command, staff and operational units are organized and operated as a 24 hour a day, seven day a week integrated combat command. Stress is placed on efficiency, speed and bold action based on prompt decisions and current intelligence.

(a) Temporary forward command posts are set up as required for the direction of specific operations.

(b) All intelligence flows into the command post and is rapidly disseminated to the echelons concerned. Control of informants, agents and other personnel engaged in penetration or surveillance of guerrilla/terrorist operations is exercised by the Intelligence Officer.

(c) Immediate on-the-spot interrogation of all captured personnel is initiated by captors to exploit current operations and maintain contact with guerrilla/terrorist formations. Results are relayed to CP while operation is in progress.

(d) Requests for assistance, interception, air support or transport are coordinated and controlled by the local pacification committee (LPC) command post. Maximum utilization is made of air for both visual and photographic reconnaissance. Commanders of all echelons are encouraged to use available aircraft for personal reconnaissance.

(e) Aircraft are normally controlled by the regional/provincial commands and placed under the operational control of local committee for specific operations.

(f) Areas in which hunter-killer teams and patrols are operating are carefully coordinated to avoid inadvertent clashes between friendly units. Peculiar pre-arranged audio and visual signals are employed by patrols and other formations to establish identity of friendly forces in doubtful situations. Lateral radio contact between patrols is established when contact with them is imminent or probable. In doubtful cases the patrol or other formation, when feasible, should contact PC Base for a spot location report on friendly units. Patrol should seek clearance and direction from PC Base before attempting to enter villages or other patrolled areas.



(g) All contacts with guerrilla/terrorists are reported immediately to local pacification command.

(h) Movements and sightings of guerrilla elements are reported immediately and intercept ambushes on routes, possible assembly areas and/or targets are plotted.

(i) Maximum use of radios and visual signals are utilized to report, expedite and control operations. Minimum reliance is placed on telegraph, telephone or other forms of communication susceptible to interdiction or interception by enemy action. Provisions for communication security must be stressed in all operations as the guerrilla/terrorist intelligence apparatus will make every effort to disrupt or intercept the security forces communications.

(6) Regional/Provincial Pacification Committee. The mission of the regional/provincial pacification committee (RPC) is to direct and support the operations of the several local pacification committees (LPC) within the region and conduct such operations that are beyond the LPC capabilities.

(a) The following is a schematic organization of a type regional pacification command and force structure in an area of active guerrilla/terrorist operations:



CHAPTER VII

TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

a. Objective: The objective of suppression activities is the extermination of guerrilla/terrorist forces, restoration of the lawful government to power, re-establishment of law, public order and the resumption of the normal peaceful pursuits of the populace in the affected areas.

b. Principals of Operations: (listed in Chapter IV, Para k). Stress maintenance of the initiative by prompt offensive action, economy of force and employment of suitably organized and trained troops and police in all weather field operations utilizing guerrilla/terrorist tactics. "Saturation tactics" and "Sweep Operations" are avoided along with the dissipation of forces in assignment of numerous small military elements to essentially defensive tasks.

c. Phasing of Operations: Suppression operations for planning purposes and as a means of measuring progress may be divided into four general phases. These phases may overlap or merge into concurrent undertakings. Various phase objectives may be achieved at widely divergent points in time in separate locales. Attempts to rigidly define operations according to a time phase are largely unrealistic and unproductive.

(1) Phase I - Counter Attack.

(a) Establishment of the pacification committee and its assumption of command of operations at the level concerned.

(b) Elimination of physical control of towns, populated areas, military garrisons or installations by guerrilla/terrorists military formations.

(c) Restoration of government civil or military officials.

(d) Provision of temporary garrisons to populated locales until self-defense units can be established.

(e) Organization and training of self-defense units in all locales of the affected area.

(f) Establishment of extensive government positive intelligence and counter-intelligence operations within the area.

(g) Initiation of an intensified psychological campaign to rally the local people in support of the government.

(h) Initiation of material aid and assistance to restore devastated property and facilities within the area of operations to include payment of damages to individuals and to subsidize resettlement projects.

(i) Initiation of patrols and probing actions aimed at locating and maintaining contact with guerrilla/terrorist military units.

(j) Destruction of guerrilla/terrorist forces who initiate attack against military or police formations in open battle.

(k) Initiation of stringent food rationing and control measures over commerce in restricted and contraband items.

(2) Phase II - Assumption of the Offensive.

(a) Implementation of all-out attack to exterminate large guerrilla/terrorist forces in the field.

(b) Isolation of guerrilla/terrorist forces from sources of food and other supplies through centralized food distribution, rationing systems, control of restricted and contraband items and self-defense force controls.

(c) Force the movement of large guerrilla/terrorist units from heavily populated rural areas to less desirable sparsely populated regions incapable of providing adequate support for their military operations.

(d) Maintain continuous pressure on the guerrilla/terrorist forces by accelerated extermination campaigns at local and regional levels forcing armed bands and flying columns to discontinue offensive operations, fragment into smaller elements and maintain continuous movement to avoid annihilation.

(e) Evacuation of elements of population suspected of supporting guerrilla/terrorists' operations and resettlement under secure conditions.

(f) Intensified search, seizure and raid operations to destroy guerrilla terrorist supply caches.

(g) Creation of sanitary zones* surrounding guerrilla/terrorist redoubt areas.

(3) Phase III - Destruction of the Guerrilla/terrorist Military and Support Elements.

General: The destruction phase is similar in many facets to the offensive phase. Its primary purpose is to exploit and consolidate

*Sanitary Zone - specific areas within designated regions or local committee areas from which the population is restricted and in which all non-government personnel encountered can be considered guerrilla/terrorists.

the gains of the offensive by maintaining continuous pressure on the remaining guerrilla/terrorist elements permitting no period in which regroupment, rest or re-establishment of logistical, recruiting and liaison facilities may be accomplished.

(a) Intensified efforts are made to destroy and intercept logistical support from local sources. Operations to destroy small garden plots, fields and cattle stock held or used by guerrilla elements in remote or sparsely populated regions are pressed.

(b) An increased tempo of psychological efforts are concentrated at inducing defection in the rank and file of the guerrilla/terrorist organizations. Themes follow a variety of leads aimed at separating the rank and file from the leaders.

(c) Offers of amnesty and/or rehabilitation are extended to the rank and file. These offers are timed to coincide with planned public appeals by families, friends and former comrades to abandon the Red cause.

(d) The public is enlisted in the general movement to halt the fighting by providing information regarding fugitive guerrilla/terrorists. Liberal use of rewards and protection for informants and their families is afforded. Stringent punishment is meted out to persons harboring fugitives.

(e) Subsequent to defeat in the field, personnel from dispersed guerrilla/terrorist units may be expected to attempt to return to their places of origin and resume private pursuits or seek refuge in familiar areas until the government pressure is relieved. Careful surveillance and frequent spot checks of resident populations should be used to pick up such returning elements. Families should be encouraged to have their relatives involved in guerrilla/terrorist activity surrender themselves voluntarily to the authorities and accept the amnesty, etc.

(f) Wherever feasible military police formations no longer necessary in local areas are returned to the region for reassignment.

(g) Continued efforts are made to track down and exterminate remnants of armed elements. Individual descriptions of leaders and other prescribed personnel are widely circulated. Hunter teams are assigned to track down and destroy these individual leaders and their remaining followers.

(h) Care should be exercised that such reductions are not premature. Intelligence and informant nets should be left in operation for a longer period to assure continued surveillance.

(4) Phase IV Rehabilitation: This phase encompasses all programs and activities necessary to restore the community to normalcy and implement the government's reform program. Adequate supervision and an intelligent and practical administration of this phase will do much to forestall future recurrences of insurgency. Care must be exercised that firm but fair practices are observed in administration and that vindictive or discriminatory

measures are not taken against groups or individuals who were former adherents of the guerrilla/terrorists.

(a) As soon as possible restrictive measures are lifted by the local committees who maintain control until directed to pass the reins of government to the civil authority.

(b) Troops and police no longer required are transferred from the area or employed in the rehabilitation program.

(c) Special land property courts and location bureaus as necessary are initiated to resettle displaced population elements including rehabilitated guerrilla/terrorists.

(d) Special economic and material aid is given to areas suffering heavy property damage, and troops and police as appropriate are sent to augment local labor shortages.

(e) An effort should be made during this phase to identify the forces of government (troops and police) in more than a superficial, supervisory role in the rehabilitation and reconstruction program. Troops and police as units and as individuals should be employed in an active role in building, planting, harvesting and other essential programs. A close association of these forces of government with the population will enhance support of the program and expedite the general recovery.

(f) Serious consideration should be given to the retention of the Self-Defense units for use in military emergencies, natural disasters and as a base for national military service programs.

d. A consideration of tactical and psychological aspects of operations, and an understanding of basic attitudes, situations, and motivating factors within the area of operation and its impact on both the forces of government and the guerrilla/terrorists is necessary to the successful conduct of suppression operations.

(1) The Guerrilla/terrorist Military:

Basically the guerrilla/terrorist mentally acknowledges and accepts his status as an illegal person whose life is forfeit if apprehended.

Accordingly he accustoms himself to a life of movement from one area or locale to another. He endures a life of physical danger and privation subject to ambush, attack or betrayal at any time. Cut off from his family, friends and original environment he lives a life of relative isolation under primitive conditions with small numbers of his comrades surrounded by security measures designed to insure his survival.

In this essentially secretive and isolated existence punctuated by periods of violence and physical combat the individual is subjected to extremes of mental and physical stress.

He depends to a large degree on the group for support and is bound by circumstances in a large measure to identification with their aims and requirements. He realizes that if he does not conform to the

group pattern or attempts to disassociate himself from the organization both he and his family will be liquidated.

He wages a war of the weak against forces essentially stronger in both material and intrinsic moral respects. His operations capitalize on stealth, speed, violence and terror; characterized by their short duration and the speedy withdrawal to safe haven in the anonymous countryside.

His operations are carefully planned to assure that the tasks contemplated can be successfully accomplished with a minimum of risk and loss to the guerrilla/terrorists. These policies indicate a realistic appreciation that survival is dependent on an ability to avoid situations in which the guerrilla/terrorist forces are obliged to engage superior government forces under field combat conditions.

One of the primary concerns, if not the primary continuing concern, of a guerrilla leader is the necessity for providing for current reliable information to insure his security and enable him to plan and execute those operational missions and other tasks necessary for his survival. The time, effort and manpower involved in intelligence gathering is large in proportion to his total resources.

A considerable proportion of his time and efforts must also be devoted to provision of the basic necessities for continued operation. The procurement and transport of food, clothing, arms and medical supplies to cache locales for future use is a major problem.

Security is another major consideration and involves allocation of a sizeable portion of his available manpower in this role on a continuing basis.

Advances in modern technical communications facilities require that he rely largely on a tenuous system of personnel couriers, letter drops and clandestine meetings with other contacts to supply him intelligence, control direction and liaison with other elements of the apparatus. His organizational structure is in a general state of continual flux caused by operational losses, shifts, reorganization and new activations.

Manpower procurement, training and the provision of medical services or other difficult and time consuming tasks that confront him require the services of considerable numbers of his available force.

The sum of these operational factors generally result in individual guerrilla/terrorist bands engaging only periodically in active combat operations of their own choosing.

This lack of capability to maintain units in sustained operations of any scope is usually carefully covered by the red central's planning of raids and scheduling of other activities of adjacent elements to give an impression of continuous offensive operations on a broad scale.

The ability of the guerrilla/terrorist units to withdraw with impunity into safe haven areas subsequent to an operation for rest, training and preparation for future operations is a primary factor both psychological and physical in their ability to continue operations or even exist as a unit.

The guerrilla/terrorist unit will seldom engage in extended offensive operations of any scope when its base of operations is actively threatened.

Although the guerrilla/terrorist element occupies only a small fraction of the whole of a safe haven area its existence is dependent upon general control of the area to enable the uninterrupted function of its communication, security and supply systems. Guerrillas generally fear hostile guerrilla elements more than attacks of conventional forces in that the methods and techniques of operation utilized cannot be readily countered.

Once a guerrilla force knows that it is being stalked by hostile guerrillas or guerrilla type forces, its full attention must be focused on the destruction or removal of this immediate threat or it must prepare to abandon the area if it is to survive.

When hostile guerrillas are operating in conjunction with government forces this threat becomes even more acute to the guerrilla/terrorist. The enemy guerrilla need only locate the guerrilla/terrorist unit and in any attack it may launch the guerrilla/terrorist realizes that he must face the combined weight of both the hostile guerrilla and superior government forces.

The guerrilla/terrorist leader realizes and understands the full capability of terror as a weapon. Morale and security of his own forces are serious continuing problems.

Although capable of utilizing and capitalizing on terror operations in his own attacks against the population and the government he is even more sensitive to this type of operation when it is directed against his own forces by hostile guerrilla type operations for the several reasons enumerated above.

(2) The Government Forces:

The military and police personnel constituting the actively engaged in punitive action against guerrilla/terrorist forces are faced with problems based on both the psychological as well as the physical facets of the operation.

Unlike conventional military operations the enemy military forces can often neither be readily located nor identified. No front line, rear area, or other conventional terms of reference apply. The enemy in the form of the guerrilla/terrorist organization may sometimes appear to assume the form of a nebulous and terrifying spectre that threatens the individual officer, soldier or policeman and his family at every turn. No area appears to offer complete safety. Assassinations, kidnappings, ambushes, raids and terrorist activity appear to happen in almost all locales.

These acts appear to be the acts of civilians, or at least the perpetrators vanish into the civil community which apparently harbors them and refuses to cooperate in their apprehension.

The normal relationship and attitudes of the military and police toward the populace undergo radical changes. Suspicion, distrust and to a certain extent fear of the civil population becomes a prevailing attitude of the military and police.

Frustration at the fruitless results of their efforts to apprehend or destroy the guerrilla/terrorists coupled with the belief that the people as a whole harbor and support the terrorists tend to lead to incidents and reprisals on the civil populace and a further rift in the relationship.

(a) The military and police become in many instances "bunker bound" or "compound fixtures" suffering the symptoms of "block house fever" and its psychologically associated ills. Often found in troops in conventional conflicts that have been committed for long periods to purely defensive positions, the offensive spirit has been lost in the apparent security of their dugouts.

Patrols tend to be overly large and restricted to regularly scheduled routes over relatively "safe areas."

Incursions into the hills are made only by large forces at infrequent intervals for short periods, and then only with much "tail gate rattling" and other advanced warnings.

More frequent or continuous field operations are often precluded on the basis (excuse) of the necessity of maintaining "protection" for the "key" cities and towns.

The government soldier although native to the country is often a stranger to the actual area of operations. This unfamiliarity with the terrain and the local population further add to the uncertainty and lack of confidence.

The propaganda themes of the guerrilla/terrorist as well as their rumor campaigns must be expected to have a certain impact on military and police personnel as well as the population as a whole.

The knowledge that capture means torture and death and that their immediate family, as well as relatives, are subject to reprisals for their participation in anti-terrorist operations does have an effect on the morale of government forces.

(b) To provide preventive as well as corrective measures to combat these tendencies a positive and realistic approach is necessary.

1. A full and continuing orientation program to acquaint all military and police personnel with guerrilla/terrorist operations, tactics and techniques should be conducted. Relationships with the civil populace should be conducted. Relationships with the civil populace should be stressed. Participation in community and public activities by military and police should be encouraged.

2. Whenever possible government families and dependents should not be evacuated from the area. The weight of the morale factor on the population as a whole viewing the mass exodus of military police and other government dependents from a threatened area merely confirms rumors that the government has already or will soon fall and that the communists are about to assume power. Dependents of government personnel can often be relocated within the area and provided suitable security at a central locale.

3. Extensive training in military tactics and techniques coupled with continuous field operations under capable leadership are necessary to instill the offensive spirit and establish a high esprit-de-corps and morale.

4. Frequent rest and leave policies for those elements actively engaged in operations should be provided. A special awards and promotions policy should be established for both military and police for successful operations and acts of bravery. Appropriate publicity should endeavor to establish personnel who distinguish themselves in operations in the public mind as "National Heroes" in the war for the preservation of "National Independence."

5. Hazardous duty pay should be provided for personnel on extended patrol operations and other activities in which the individual is required to assume appreciable risks above and beyond that encountered by the bulk of the forces engaged in operations.

6. Whenever possible military and police forces assigned to areas of operation at the local and regional level should be retained in the same general area during the active phases of operation to provide forces thoroughly familiar with local conditions, populace and geography. Rotation of duty should be afforded within the local or regional area.

7. Of all the factors and measures above that of providing intelligent, capable, forceful and professionally competent officers and NCO's in the military and police establishments is the most important single factor in overcoming the problems enumerated.

e. Suppression Tactics and Techniques

(1) General:

No rote, drill or other rigidly defined tactics or techniques can be prescribed in the conduct of suppression operations.

Flexibility, intelligence and ingenuity are the keynote themes.

As the guerrilla/terrorist elements react to counter various government operations new or revised methods appropriate to the locale of operation must be found to overcome or circumvent these barriers.

This text is not intended to detail the almost infinite variations of small unit tactics and techniques that may be used or improvised. Only general guidelines are offered to highlight the nature and pattern of activity.

(2) Principals:

The general progression of detailed operations follow the simple and well-known principals of:

- (a) Finding the enemy
- (b) Fixing the enemy
- (c) Fighting the enemy
- (d) Finishing the enemy

(3) Types of operations:

The majority of government operations can be classified into one or more of the following general types:

- (a) Meeting engagements
- (b) Attacks
- (c) Defense
- (d) Ambushes, "Q" Operations* and Provocative actions.**
- (e) Raids
- (f) Pursuit actions
- (g) Interception actions
- (h) Terror Operations

* Operations in which an ostensibly lucrative target is offered to lure the guerrilla/terrorist to attack.

** Provocative actions: Actions initiated by the government to provoke the guerrillas to attack.

(4) Scope and character of operations:

It must be remembered that the units concerned in the actions in (3) above may range from a few individuals through platoons to an infrequent battalion or regimental size engagement. The actions are usually characterized by their sudden or unexpected occurrence, violent nature, short duration, close range and a relatively high casualty ratio to the number of individuals engaged.

CHAPTER VIII

SCENARIO EXAMPLE OF TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Within the concept of organization and conduct of operations in Chapter VI (see sketch showing deployment of PC Forces in local area), the following type scenario actions are illustrated as examples. The purpose of incorporating these examples is to afford substantive illustrations of some of the types of detailed activity, circumstances and tactics that may accompany the operations.

a. Meeting engagement pursuit and interception:

While conducting a pre-dawn foot patrol from the Temporary Base west of Town "C" to Hamlet "F" a reinforced rifle squad of the patrol company suddenly encounters at approximately 50 yards range a group of 5-8 men crossing the road south of Hamlet "F" at about 0500 hours. A shrill bird whistle is sounded by the patrol as the prearranged challenge and is almost immediately answered by a burst of sub-machine gun fire from the group of suspects. Fire is immediately returned by the patrol who have hit the ground as the challenge was sounded.


A second whistle by the patrol leader signals a rush attack by bounds. The patrol advances firing and receives a return fire from the guerrillas. On signal the patrol hits the ground and short fuze grenades are thrown. Figures are seen running into the woods to the west. The patrol leader halts his advance and immediately organizes his pursuit. The patrol radio operator has notified Co CP at the Temporary Base that a contact has been made, the patrol location and the direction of the guerrillas' withdrawal. (Five minutes have elapsed since the guerrillas were sighted.) Two guerrilla bodies are found near the road. One guerrilla is dead, the other wounded. Two patrol members have been wounded. A National Policeman attached to the patrol begins an immediate interrogation of the wounded guerrilla. The trail dog is given the scent and placed on a long leash. The patrol, less two (2) guards left for the wounded and prisoner, advances in a skirmish line maintaining visual contact.

The Co CP has dispatched by truck an intercept squad to take up positions on the main road running west of town and south of the incident area.

The regular patrol squad operating to the west of Hamlet "F" is alerted and directed to move to intercept and maintain radio contact with the squad engaged in pursuit.

A request for helicopter reconnaissance flight over the area is dispatched by the PC Base to Regional HQs along with the contact report.

An ambulance and truck with half a rifle squad accompanied by police interrogators leave for the scene of the incident.



Fifteen minutes after initiating pursuit the patrol encounters a wounded guerrilla located by the trail dog. The guerrilla is killed resisting arrest. A short time later the trail indicates that the remaining elements of the guerrilla formation (estimated 4-5 personnel) have split into two groups. One heading north and the other south. The patrol leader decides to split his remaining force of seven men and continue pursuit of the larger northern group with four men, the radio operator and the dog. The second in command is detailed to tail two men and follow the smaller southern group estimated at 2 men. The Co CP and both the other friendly patrols in the vicinity are informed of the decision utilizing simple voice code on the radio.

At 0630 the reconnaissance helicopter is over the area and in voice contact with the four man patrol headed north and the other patrols in the area.

At 0645 the helicopter reports sighting three men briefly in a patch of woods on a low ridge between the estimated position of regular patrol operating in the area and the pursuit patrol.

Direction and position of the subjects is reported and the regular patrol operating in the area assumes intercept positions perpendicular to the axis of the movement.

The distance between the intercept patrol and the converging pursuit patrol is estimated at a mile and a half at this time.

Intercept positions are established by the regular patrol and to the south by the additional squad from the Temporary Base as indicated on the sketch.

At approximately 0730 three men appear on a low rise 50 yards to the front of the intercept patrol and approach on a diagonal. All are armed and in civilian clothes. At approximately 100 yards range the guerrillas note something suspicious and take cover. Heavy fire is opened immediately by four men of the regular patrol who can observe the guerrillas. One guerrilla is observed to dash back over the rise; the two others are found dead.

The patrol reports the intercept and initiates pursuit of the remaining guerrilla.

The element of the patrol pursuing the southern guerrilla party is ambushed by their quarry and the patrol leader (assistant squad leader) is killed and one man slightly wounded. The two surviving patrol members move to the main road to the south and are picked up by the southern intercept squad blocking the main road at 0930 hours.

At 1115 hours two figures dash across the road toward the western end of the area covered by the intercept patrol.

Fire is opened by two soldiers observing the crossing. A burst of machine pistol fire downs one guerrilla; the other makes a getaway. The intercept squad organizes immediate pursuit and notifies Co Base of its action. The guerrilla downed is wounded and a police interrogator is sent for. In the meanwhile, the assistant squad leader interrogates the subject and another soldier acts as security.

Pursuit of the remaining two guerrillas is broken off at 1600 hours.

The following information is obtained from the first wounded guerrilla apprehended.

The terrorist patrol was enroute to a rendezvous with a support element to cache supplies somewhere west of Hamlet "F".

Parent guerrilla unit was the "Red Hammer Band" of sixty-seven armed terrorists presently located in the center of the PC area.

The captured guerrilla reveals that the terrorist patrol consisted of nine men and that on initial contact the getaway man probably made good his escape as he was 50-100 yards in rear of the main group.

The PC Base prepares immediate actions against the rendezvous area and the reported locale of the "Red Hammer" unit base realizing that the guerrillas have, in all probability, received word of the action and moved. Interrogation of the captured guerrillas is continued.

Box Score:

Government Force

13 Man Patrol
2 KIA
2 WIA

Guerrilla/terrorist

9 Man Action Group
2 WIA
4 KIA
3 Escapees

b. Attack by government forces:

At 1800 hours Hunter Killer Team No. 4 operating between and north of Town "A" and Village "B" reports location of a guerrilla encampment located in the vicinity of a destroyed mill. Tight enemy security prevents detailed reconnaissance of the site.

Guerrilla/terrorist strength is estimated at 25-30. Enemy strength and disposition indicates that an attack by the Hunter-Killer Team would be only partially effective and would permit the escape of the majority.

The Hunter-Killer Team is restricted by the PC Base to area surveillance to prevent compromise of their presence. Plans for an attack get underway immediately.

Ground reconnaissance by troop leaders will not be possible due to approaching darkness and the security considerations. A night attack is ruled out because of the same considerations and the probability of darkness covering the escape or withdrawal of the guerrilla/terrorist unit.

The assistant patrol leader of Hunter-Killer Team No. 4 exfiltrates from the area and is picked up at a rendezvous spot by a jeep and returned to the PC Base at 2000 hours.

The PC commander assisted by his staff prepares his plan of attack based on the detailed information of the area provided by the Hunter-Killer Team.

A dawn attack by the reserve rifle company, reinforced by two additional Hunter-Killer Teams, a 20 man section of National Police and an Aero Combat Recon Company from the Regional Pacification Force is planned.

Region approves the plan and allocates an Aero Combat Recon Company to the Local Pacification Committee for the duration of the operation.

By midnight the LPC S-3 Air Liaison Officer and the Company Executive Officer of the attacking rifle company depart by helicopter for the air base to brief the Aero Combat Company on its mission and accompany the unit in the attack.

(See sketch of attack) The Hunter-Killer party from Team No. 4 at locale No. 7 quietly removes the guerrilla sentry and guides units to assembly positions south of the stream. The stream is about 3-4 feet deep and banks are negotiable by foot troops. Troops arrive in position about thirty minutes prior to the initiation of the attack.

PHASE I - The Assault:

Attack is led off by the Aero Weapons Platoon Helicopters at 0640 rapidly approaching Hill 411 from the north and salvoing rockets and directing machine gun fire into the nose of the hill occupied by the guerrillas and the guerrilla machine gun position at #5. Immediately behind the Aero Weapons Platoon the Aero Infantry Platoon lands and initiates the attack of the bivouac.

Hunter-Killer Team #4 in position on Hill 411 signals their position by flares and signal rockets as the Aero Weapons Platoon approaches

and occupy blocking position on the ridge to the west of the guerrilla bivouac. As the signal flares from Hill 411 are fired by HK Team #4 the attacking troops cross the stream and move on the double to occupy the blocking positions indicated.

The Aero Weapons Platoon provides cover for the landing and attack of the Aero Infantry Platoon and covers the open areas to the west of the clearing. The helicopters of the Aero Infantry Platoon land in the reserve area near position #7 and move an additional rifle squad and a team of National Police to Hill 411.

PHASE II - The Sweep:

As anticipated the suddenness and violence of the attack causes the guerrillas to immediately abandon their bivouac and initiate their emergency evacuation plan.

One group attempts to escape down the ridge to the west and is turned back by HK Team #4. The attack of the Aero Infantry Platoon drives the remainder off the high ground and into the woods to the southwest of their bivouac.

While the bivouac site and Hill 411 are being cleared and secured the troops from the south have occupied the blocking positions.

The reinforced Aero Infantry Platoon then holds Hill 411, the 2d Rifle Platoon and the National Police secure the eastern edge of the circle.

The 1st Platoon reinforced by HK Teams #4 and #6 conduct a sweep through the woods to the east swinging on a pivot near position #6 to drive the remaining guerrillas toward the open area north of the 2d Platoon blocking positions. Their limit of advance is the eastern edge of the woods parallel to the trail leading from Hill 411 to the Old Mill.

Automatic weapons are placed behind the sweep area sighted along the edges of the woods to take care of any individuals slipping through the converging line.

After considerable heavy fighting the sweeping troops arrive on the no-fire line. A few guerrillas not accounted for in the sweep are cut down as they attempt to move individually across the cleared area ahead of the troops or escape through the woods in the 2d Platoon area.

The operation is concluded with the extermination or capture of 27 terrorists. From prisoner interrogation it is learned that three terrorists escaped during the attack and another eleven were absent on operations.

c. Defense:

(1) Guerrilla Situation

The guerrilla/terrorist band (72 effectives) in the area to the west of Community "C" has been hard hit by the Government restrictions on food and the system in force of central rationing and cooking control in the towns and villages. Outlying farms have seldom more than three days rations for the inhabitants on hand and raiding continually for much small stores is both unprofitable and dangerous. Recent raids by government HK Teams have resulted in the disclosure and destruction of three of the bands food caches.

Winter is approaching and the Armed Bands' emergency food stocks are dangerously low. A short rations policy has been in force for more than a week and the effects on the morale of the guerrilla/terrorist personnel is already evident. Red District Headquarters can offer little support in augmenting the rations and the leader is instructed to take "vigorous steps" to improve his situation. It is therefore a reluctant decision by the Armed Band Leader that initiates planning for the attack.

Attacking an armed village defended by its inhabitants for the purpose of obtaining supplies with military reinforcements within seventeen (17) miles road distance of the target area is not an easy task. However, Community "G" appears to offer the best chances of success considering both the size of the defending force, distance from reinforcements and the quantity of food available.

It is estimated that approximately twenty tons of tinned, dried and sacked provisions are stored in the Community Warehouse in "G".

The guerrilla leader hopes to be able to obtain 10-12 tons of these supplies and calculates his means to move and dispose in cache sites this rather large amount of stores.

Trucks, as well as carrying parties will be used and the routes to, as well as the cache sites themselves must be prepared in advance.

His village intelligence informs him of the strength, disposition, and routine of the defense force.

The decision is made to launch the attack late in the afternoon to catch the community while the majority of the SDF are still scattered at work in the fields, seize the supplies and make their withdrawal under cover of darkness utilizing a maximum period of darkness to transport and cache the loot, as well as covering their tracks and drawing off pursuit.

The time factor is important and a maximum time of three hours on target for the complete operation is allocated. The Armed Band knows that PC Base will respond immediately to the emergency attack call from "G", and that government forces realize that they (the guerrilla/terrorists) will have arranged a series of road blocks, mines and other interdictory type ambushes enroute to the target area and therefore will, of necessity proceed at relatively low road speeds, toward "G".

One delaying action ambush of some size is planned several miles to the south of the main road, between Village "D" and Town "C", another to the north on the main road east of Village "D". Each ambush will be executed by six guerrillas armed with machine pistols, automatic rifles and grenades. The mission of these ambush parties is to execute maximum delay on government forces attempting to reach the target area. Two additional parties of five men each will construct barriers and plant mines along the routes at other points.

Five (5) trucks supplied by the support organizations will be utilized by the guerrillas to transport the bulk of the supplies to off loading points where carrying parties will move them to the caches.

Air attack by government forces is discussed by the guerrillas and it is decided that because of the proximity of the village and the difficulty in distinguishing between the civil populace and the guerrillas that aerial suppressive fire by government aircraft cannot be effectively employed.

The time factor and approaching darkness appear to rule out the relief of the community by airborne forces. Detection and elimination of the self-defense outposts is placed high on the priority task listing.

Target date for the attack is tentatively set for the following week.

(2) Defense Situation (See Sketch):

Community "G" (350 population) in the eastern portion of the PC locale has recently reorganized its defense subsequent to the completion of the self-defense units training program. An army sergeant and two national policemen are stationed in the community. The army sergeant is in command of the self-defense section of thirty men. The two police are responsible for intelligence and normal police activity. Two special constables are assigned from the PC Supply Section as guards at the community storehouse. Only ten of the thirty men are on duty at any one time excepting emergencies, alerts or daily formations. The other men continue their regular civilian pursuits but are obliged to maintain their arms with them at all times and assemble on call. The platoon is armed with rifles and shotguns. Two automatic rifles, a light machine gun and a bazooka are retained at the SD Post where a radio is operated netting with the PC Base. Three handle/talkie type radios are used by OP's established and maintained by the SD Section. Community "G" has not previously been subject to attack by the guerrilla/terrorists but was occupied by an Armed Band for several days during the initial insurrection.

On several occasions outlying farms have been raided for food contributions.

Three young men of the community are known to be with the guerrilla/terrorist units, their families have been removed from the community.

Two other families in the area have recently requested permission to leave the area. The reasons given for the desire to move do not appear to be valid.

Police informants in the area have failed to turn up any definite information, but realize that some of the population are restive. PC Base is notified and the local SD unit is quietly informed of the need for increased vigilance. For a period of two weeks nothing unusual occurs and the populace appear to have lost their uneasiness.

At 1700 hours on the day of the attack the ten man SD Section on duty is deployed as follows: 2 men each on the North and South Road Check Station/Barriers; 2 men on patrol between OP #1 on Hill 44C and the woods to the north, one man each at OP 1 & 2, and two men in the SD Post, one in the sandbagged watchtower with a BAR and one on the gate near the base of the hill.

The Army Sergeant is in the SD Compound area. One policeman is on duty near the radio, the other is in the village area. Three off-duty SD personnel on patrol the previous night are sleeping in the compound area. Half a dozen of the off-duty personnel are working in the village area, the balance are in the fields adjoining the community.

At 1705 a young boy from Farm "A" arrives at the SD Compound on the run, shouting that there are "Reds" in the woods to the east of his house.


A truck approaches the South Road Block and is observed by the sentry in the watchtower. It contains a man in police uniform and a soldier standing in the bed behind the cab. A tarpaulin covers the rear of the truck. The occupants of the cab cannot be observed. The truck is obliged to halt at the road barrier and the SD sentries are observed talking with the occupants.

The sentry at the gate to the SD Compound is suddenly fired on and killed by a woman crossing the street who produces a concealed sawed-off shotgun. The woman then runs off in the direction of the warehouse.

Two other women open fire at the constable on duty at the gate of the storehouse fence, wounding him and hurl grenades at the large warehouse door. The sentry returns the fire, eliminating one of the women and in turn is killed by the remaining woman who enters the warehouse and opens the large side doors.

Firing is heard from the south roadblock, and the sentry in the watchtower who is by this time tolling the large alarm bell, observes the truck pass the roadblock and speed toward the village.

He shouts the information to the sergeant who is turning out the sleeping members of the SD unit in the compound.



The policeman on duty at the radio is relaying the alarm to the PC Base.

Three groups of approximately ten armed men each are seen moving toward "G" on the double in a skirmish formation.

The first group is between Farm "A" and the SD Compound. The second and third groups are approaching from the direction of Farms "B" and "C" respectively. Firing is heard from the vicinity of Farm "B". The speeding truck rams the closed wooden village vehicle gate knocking it open. The watchtower sentry takes the truck cab under fire with the BAR and the truck swerves to a halt inside the village. A group of armed men concealed in the bed leap to the ground and take cover in the roadside ditch and commence firing at the SD Compound.

The Sergeant posts an additional BAR near the east edge of the compound directing fire at the truck borne group at the base of the hill and the storehouse area, and sets the LMG up with the remaining two men on the west to cover the approach of the group from Farm "A". Light mortar shells start landing in the vicinity of the SD Compound.

The Sergeant launches a red and green flare signaling the assembly of the dispersed SD personnel outside the village at previously established assembly points north and south of the community in accordance with the rehearsed defense plan SOP.

The boy from Farm "A" is dispatched by a wire gap entrance from the compound to the village with a message for the SD personnel in the village to take the group at the southgate and the storehouse under fire.

The mortar fire increases and hits are scored on the buildings in the compound and one is set on fire. The guerrilla truck group attempts an attack up the hill to the compound under cover of the mortar fire but are driven off with several casualties.

Firing is heard in the eastern edge of "G" and guerrillas are seen scaling the fence and removing wire from the rear of the storehouse fence.

Sporadic firing is heard from the vicinity of Farm "B" and Hill 440.

The forward movement of the guerrillas from Farm "A" is halted by the machine gun fire from the compound.

One of the houses between the SD Compound and the warehouse is on fire. The SD man in the watchtower reports a group of guerrillas in the vicinity of the mill at the northeast edge of the community.

The attack has been underway for forty minutes and it is almost dark.

1745 Two reconnaissance helicopters arrive over the area and circle the community. Attempts to establish communications between the helicopters and the SD section by radio fail.

Visual blinker signals are transmitted by the Sergeant requesting the helicopters fire on the storehouse. However, ground visibility conditions from the air by this time prevent observation of the target which is obscured by smoke from burning buildings and darkness.

1810 From the sounds of firing grenade blasts and screaming and yelling in the village the guerrillas are clearing the community buildings from north to south and will shortly control most of "G" outside the compound. Trucks are heard approaching the village from the east along the road track.

1820 Firing is renewed to the east of the village toward Farm "C" and the mortar fire on the SD Compound is resumed. The SD man in the watchtower is killed and one man on the machine gun is wounded. The SD Control Post Building receives a direct mortar hit putting the radio out of action and setting the roof of the building on fire. A Force of about fifteen guerrillas again attempt to storm the SD Compound but are driven off.

1830 The mortar fire lifts and a lull in the small arms firing follows. The sound of trucks backing up and turning around accompanied by considerable shouting of commands is heard in the area of the storehouse.

1845 The watchtower is manned against several BAR magazines loaded with tracers. The bazooka is assembled and the supply of twenty rounds of 3.5" ammunition readied.

The storehouse is taken under fire by the bazooka and tracer fire from the two BAR's. Several hits are scored, by the bazooka on the storehouse, and two fires are started in the building. The firing continues until the bazooka ammunition is exhausted.

1900 The guerrilla mortar fire starts again and several machine guns and other automatic weapons take the compound under heavy fire. The policeman is wounded. The Sergeant prepares to abandon the compound. Kerosene is thrown on the buildings, and the copies of the community records, rosters and other documents are readied for burning.

The two wounded SD men are armed and concealed in a cellar.

1910 Preparations for evacuation are halted at the sound of helicopters approaching. Recognition flares are ignited by the SD personnel in the compound. Blinker signals from the helicopters indicate that

two helicopters will discharge personnel in the compound area and request a pad be illuminated.

A small landing pad is outlined in kerosene and ignited and a flare is lighted on the sandbagged roof of the watchtower.

The helicopters make a rapid approach under fire and in succession hover and hastily discharge two officers, eight riflemen, a HK Team and four National Police. Equipment bundles slung under the helicopters are dropped while hovering.

Three of the reinforcements are wounded during the landing.

1930 The defense of the compound is reorganized and radio communications with the PC Base and the helicopters re-established.

Flares are dropped by the helicopters and a truck proceeding along the East Vehicle Track is taken under fire.

Smoke obscures the storehouse area from aerial observation.

Reports from PC Base indicate that the northern relief group is engaged at a road block about seven miles north of "G", and another group moving in from the south is about five miles from "G".

1945 The guerrilla/terrorists fire slackens and trucks are heard moving to the east.

Grenade detonations and firing is heard in the area to the east of Farm "C" and "B".

The helicopters are requested to illuminate the area but refrain from firing.

Two trucks are observed halted on the vehicle track about 1200 yards east of "G", one is on fire. The small arms fire from this area continues.

2000 A runner arrives at the compound area from the element of the SD unit caught working north of the community area at the initiation of the attack. They relate the following events:

"A" group of eight SD members assembled at the northern rendezvous area 100 yards north of town about 45 minutes after the attack was initiated. This group moved into the woods east of Farm "C" by dark and proceeded toward the vehicle track where several trucks were heard moving toward "G". A three (3) man patrol was dispatched to "G" to attempt to re-establish contact with the SD Compound and determine the situation. The patrol returned reporting that the guerrillas controlled the town, were looting the storehouse and loading trucks with the contents. They also reported that the SD Compound was under heavy guerrilla fire and they could not penetrate to effect a contact.

The patrol returned and an ambush of the guerrilla vehicles was layed on the vehicle track. The ambush was sprung and two out of four guerrilla trucks moving to the east were knocked out. A fire fight with the guerrilla escort developed and the ambush group retired to the wooded area to the north.

The main guerrilla force was seen to be retiring from "G" in small groups as the runner worked his way to the SD compound. Cattle were being herded east and groups of civilians under guard were also observed moving with the guerrillas.

The HK Team is immediately dispatched with the runner to return to the ambush area, pick up the SD ambush group and maintain contact with the retreating guerrillas and the radio progress to the SD Compound.

2020 The relief column from PC Base arrives. Pursuit of the guerrillas is organized and implemented.

A portion of the relief troops are detailed to fire fighting, collecting wounded and dead and assisting civilians.

(3) Summary and Critique:

(a) The defense of "G" by the SD Section although failing to prevent penetration of the community by the guerrilla/terrorist band was successful in thwarting the accomplishment of their mission.

The psychological aspects of the operation should not be ignored.

The guerrilla/terrorists were forced to withdraw hastily with only a fraction of the supplies needed after suffering considerable casualties. The population and the SD Section gained confidence in their ability to fight and defend their fields and homes.

The actions of the guerrilla/terrorists during the attack have alienated the populace from further voluntary support of their cause, and have renewed their belief that their own defense force assisted by government troops is capable of defeating the enemy.

The impact on the morale of the guerrilla/terrorists and their confidence in their leader and their ability to exercise coercion on the local populace has been shaken.

A vigorous pursuit and follow-up by government forces should exploit this defeat.

(b) The guerrilla/terrorist leader realizes that several basic factors were involved in the failure of his operation, including:

1. Lack of adequate guerrilla/terrorist forces in the attack.

2. Self-defense organization and techniques involving fluid type defense of the community area.

3. Failure to consider the impact of air-delivered government reinforcements to assist in control of key points.

(c) Disposition and tasks of the attacking guerrilla/terrorist band indicates the variety of tasks and requirements necessary to mount an operation under the security situation prevalent in this area.

1. Total guerrilla/terrorist force - 94 (66 guerrilla/terrorist band; 28 civilian support organization)

2. Organized and deployed as follows:

<u>a.</u> Security Force (Ambush Parties)	12
(2-6 Man Groups)	
(Mine Planting)	
(and Obstacle Detail)	<u>10</u>
	22
 <u>b.</u> Attack Force (Interior Assault Pty)	4*
(Crash Truck Detail)	6
(Main Atk. Grps. Farms	
A-C)	<u>28</u>
	38
 <u>c.</u> Transport Force (Truck Drivers	
and Guard)	10
(Carrying Party)	
(Porters and	
Loading Detail)	<u>24*</u>
	34*

*Civilian Support Organization Personnel

CHAPTER IX

A M B U S H E S

The wide variation of forms of the ambush preclude detailed treatment in this work. However, certain general considerations of the ambush as an operational technique in counter-insurgency operations should be covered.

(1) The ambush is generally classified under two broad categories:

(a) Hasty Ambush: An improvised operation designed to capitalize on an immediate opportunity, e.g., patrol observes an enemy group approaching and hastily conceals themselves to take the group under fire on signal or challenge.

(b) Deliberate Ambush: A carefully planned operation based on intelligence of enemy movements or location.

(2) Several types of ambush exist under the two categories listed above. Primary types are:

(a) Stakeout Ambush: Ambush party deploy covering a route or locale which the target will traverse or visit.

(b) Moving Ambush: Ambush party traverse a route along which the target will travel, approaching the target from the opposite direction or overtaking the target from the rear. E.G.: A reliable source reports a group of disguised terrorists traveling from town "A" to "B" on bicycles. A truck carrying several concealed military and police in civilian clothes is dispatched from "B" to "A" and upon passing terrorists suddenly challenge the group and open fire when they attempt to resist arrest.

(c) Rendezvous Ambush: A variation of the stakeout in which the target is lured or "set-up" for ambush by subterfuge or pretext by an agent, informer or traitor within the enemy movement or on false information "leaked" by government forces.

(d) Drive Ambush: The enemy is flushed or driven from a camp or other refuge by a small party and attempt to retire into the surrounding area where several small ambush parties have previously been posted on "Killing Stands" affording multiple fields of fire and observation.

(3) Because of the sensitivity of Guerrilla/Terrorist elements to ambush and their elaborate security precautions unusual care must be exercised in both planning and execution to avoid abortion of the operation or a counter-ambush by the enemy.

The following apply as general tenet to be considered:

(a) Ambush parties employed in a deliberate ambush usually will not be uniformed or bear arms openly unless documented as the enemy. Care should be exercised in selection of personnel to avoid use of individuals who possess unusual physical characteristics or who are well known to the enemy. Similarly, the selection of persons afflicted with colds or other ailments likely to cause compromise should be avoided.

(b) Ambush parties should contain an absolute minimum of personnel necessary to accomplish the task. Emphasis should be placed on utilizing selected personnel carefully positioned to deliver a well-directed volume of fire to assure a high-skill ratio on the first volley. A well-planned ambush by a few men can account for several times their number in the target group. A large ambush party greatly increases the likelihood of compromise and, in addition, confuses and hampers the follow-up action.

(c) Careful surveillance of the ambush locale should be given to consider the presence of bystanders, inhabitants or other factors likely to hamper or compromise the operation.

(d) Extreme care should be exercised to avoid acting on enemy planted or other erroneous information in laying an ambush. The casualties resulting to an ambush party from a counter ambush by the enemy are a justifiable risk accepted in the conduct of operations. However, the seriousness of killing a group of innocent civilians in the mistaken belief that they are guerrilla/terrorist personnel cannot be overemphasized. The effects of such a mistake can adversely influence the conduct of overall operations in an entire area.

(e) Patience and perseverance are prime virtues in the conduct of ambush operations. The determination to continue stakeouts and/or surveillance of suspected locales for protracted periods of time in the absence of physical evidence of the enemy's presence is necessary to success. If one-quarter of all ambushes planned pay off the overall operation can be considered to be very successful.

(4) Equipment Considerations:

(a) Silenced Weapons: The use of silencers or suppressors on weapons employed by the ambush party is highly desirable; permitting an additional short time delay in the reaction of the target and confusion as to the location of the ambush party.

(b) Killing Power: Selection of weapons and ammunition for the ambush party should receive careful consideration in light of the specific conditions existing. Weapon selection should be optimized on delivering a one shot knockdown-kill. Night pistol and carbine type calibers (30 carbine), 7.62 Pistol, 32 ACP, 38 and 9mm, although handy to aim and fire are notoriously poor killers. Weapons set to deliver full automatic fire are excellent for volume area coverage but are difficult to control and a poor choice for selective killing in situations where bystanders are present or the danger of hitting other members of the ambush party is probable.

Hollow point, soft nosed or other expansion type ammunition of the type sold commercially for hunting is desirable for maximum destruction on the target and prevention of "wounded getaways." The 12 gauge shotgun is an excellent weapon for ambush usage. Utilizing rifled slugs it is accurate enough for hits on a man sized target up to 50 yards. Loaded with small buckshot (#1-4) or # 2 or # 4 shot it is effective up to 30 yards. Since the majority of ambush operations are conducted at relatively short distances the range of the shotgun is generally adequate.

(c) Illumination Devices: Illumination of a night ambush site at the time the ambush is sprung is desirable but presents problems in either blinding the ambush party or obscuring target personnel. In general portable battery spotlights or large multi-cell flashlights are most satisfactory. Flares (either ground or aerial types) or kerosene trenches have decided disadvantages.

(d) Explosives: The use of either set charges, booby traps or grenades in deliberate foot ambushes are generally impracticable. Either they cause as much danger to the ambush party as to the target or they are ineffective in kill assurance and require the target to follow a rigid pattern route in a close formation.

Exceptions to the above exist in the case of vehicle ambush or when the target element is located within a building, cave, or similar fixed locale.